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A MEXICAN PERSPECTIVE ON NAFTA AND THE
REGULATION OF UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES
CLAUS VON WOBESER*
INTRODUCTION
This paper will analyze the problem of unfair trade practices from the
Mexican perspective and, therefore, I will first provide a brief summary
of Mexican Antidumping ("AD")' and Countervailing Duty ("CVD")
Laws.2 I will also review Chapter 19 of the North American Free Trade
Agreement ("NAFTA"),3 and will address some of the implications this
Agreement may have on the Mexican legal system in AD and CVD
matters .4
The importance of the analysis of Mexican domestic Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Laws in regard to NAFTA is that the negotiators
of NAFTA have decided that each of the three countries involved-
Mexico, Canada, and the United States-will apply domestic AD and
CVD laws to imports from the other countries. The draft of the NAFTA
treaty establishes a panel system for the review of final AD and CVD
determinations by the administrative authorities of the three countries
similar to the one adopted by the Free Trade Agreement between United
States and Canada.$
I. MEXICAN AD LAW AND CVD LAW
First, I will discuss the relationship between the different laws and
treaties Mexico has entered into and is about to enter into regarding AD
law and CVD law. Hopefully, this will clarify which statute will prevail
over the other because, as will be shown, there are contradictions between
Mexican domestic laws and the treaties Mexico has entered into.
A. Mexican Laws Regarding AD and CVD
The first law that was enacted in Mexico regarding dumping and
subsidies was the Ley Reglamentaria del Articulo 131 de la Constitucion
* Von Wobeser y Sierra, S.C., Mexico City; Member, ICC Court of Arbitration, 1982-88;
Lic. en Derecho, Escuela Libre de Derecho; Doctor of Law, University of Paris; admitted to Mexican
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1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 10, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, Antidumping
Code, reprinted in BASIc DOCUMIENTS OF INTERNATIONAL EcoNobac LAW (Stephen Zamora & Ronald
A. Brand eds., 1990) [hereinafter GATT].
2. Le Reglumentaria del Articulo 131 de la Constitucidn Poltica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos
en Materia de Comercio Exterior, DIAto OncIA. DE LA FEDERACi6N, Jan. 13, 1986 [hereinafter
Mexican Foreign Trade Law]; El Reglamento Contra Practicas Desleales de Comercio Internacional,
Dtuo OFcsAL DE LA FaDERACION, Nov. 25, 1986 (Regulations against Unfair Trade Practices;
amended May 19, 1988).
3. Oct. 7 draft, 1992, U.S.-Mex.-Can., ch. 19 [hereinafter NAFTA].
4. One clarification I would like to make at the outset is that I have only reviewed the Spanish
version of the NAFTA draft, and therefore it is likely that the expressions I use in English are
not the ones that will ultimately appear in the treaty.
5. NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1904.
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Politica de los -Estados Unidos Mexicanos,6 which will be referred to as
the Mexican Foreign Trade Law. The regulations for the Foreign Trade
Law were enacted by the Executive Branch on November 25, 1986.1
Mexico is a party to the AD Code of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade ("GATT")8 which was published in the official gazette of
Mexico on April 21, 1988, and came into force on May 10, 1988. Mexico
is not a party to the GATT Code on Subsidies.
NAFTA should be adopted by Canada, the United States, and Mexico
in the near future. The question is which legal statute will prevail, taking
into account that there are contradictions among the different legal bodies.
Article 133 of the Mexican Constitution9 establishes that the Consti-
tution, the laws of Congress, and all treaties that are in accordance with
the Constitution and that are signed by the President with thle approval
of the Senate, are the supreme law of the country. The Mexican Federal
Laws and the International Treaties have the same position in the legal
hierarchy; therefore, treaties entered into by Mexico after a Federal Law
is issued will automatically amend the Federal Law to the extent it is
in conflict with the treaty. There is no need for an amendment by
Congress to the Federal Law. Consequently, Mexican treaties entered into
by the President and signed by the Senate are self-executing and will
not require implementing legislation. Due to this fact, NAFTA will
obviously prevail over the AD Code of GATT and over the Mexican
Foreign Trade Law with regard to issues of AD and CVD law related
to the importation of American and Canadian products covered under
NAFTA. The AD Code will prevail over the Mexican Foreign Trade Law
in relation to countries such as the United States and Canada which
have adopted the GATT AD Code.
B. Elements of AD Under Mexican Law
According to the Mexican Foreign Trade Law and AD Code, there
are three elements which must be fulfilled for the existence of a dumping
practice: (1) the existence of a price discrimination; (2) an injury or the
likelihood that an injury will be suffered by the national industry; and
(3) a relationship between the two above-mentioned factors.
1. Price Discrimination
Under Mexican law, price discrimination occurs when the exporter of
goods into Mexico sells the goods at a lower price than the normal price
at which it sells its products in the country of origin. For Mexican law
purposes, "normal price" is defined as a price fixed under free market
6. DuAIio OIc,.L DE LA FEOEkACI6N, Jan. 13, 1986.
7. These regulations were amended on May 19, 1988.
8. GATT, supra note 1, Antidumping Code.
9. MEX. CONST. art. 133.
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economy conditions. In order to establish whether a dumping practice
exists, the normal price must be compared with the price of the imported
products.
There are four methods used to compare the normal price with the
price of the imported products. The method of comparison is between
the price of the same products sold by the exporter in its country of
origin against the price of the imported products. This is the most
commonly used method in antidumping investigations in Mexico. Second,
if the exporter does not sell in the country of origin, the comparison
will be made with the price at which the exporter sells its products in
a third country. Third, if the exporter does not sell to a third country,
or if parties have not provided sufficient elements to make the comparison,
the Mexican Ministry of Commerce and Industrial Development (Sec-
retariat de Comercio y Fomento Industrial or SECOFI) may reconstruct
the price, taking into account production costs, administrative costs, and
profit. Finally, in countries with centrally planned economies, the price
to be compared will be the price of a similar product in a free market
economy or the price of the product to be exported from a country with
a free market economy.
2. Injury or Likelihood of Injury
According to Mexican law, an injury is the loss in the assets of Mexican
companies or the inability to obtain a legal profit that the Mexican
producers may suffer due to the dumping practice. Under Mexican Foreign
Trade Law'0 there is no requirement that there be an injury or likelihood
of injury for the existence of a dumping practice. Under the GATT AD
Code," however, a finding of injury is a condition for determining that
there is dumping. Because the United States and Canada are parties to
the code, the existence of the injury or likelihood of injury must be
proven.
There is a likelihood of injury under Mexican law where the estab-
lishment of a new industry or the development of existing industries is
jeopardized. To prove the injury or the likelihood of injury, three main
elements must be established under Mexican Law. The first is an increase
in the volume of imports. The second is the price of the importations
in dumping conditions, i.e., a difference between the export price and
the home country or reconstructed price. The third is accounting, eco-
nomic, and financial elements such as a decrease of domestic production,
a decrease in the utilization of installed capacity, a decrease in domestic
business participation in the market, or a decrease in prices and profits
of domestic businesses. The price discrimination must be the direct cause
of the injury or likelihood of injury to the Mexican industry.
C. The AD Procedure Under Mexican Law
The antidumping procedure under Mexican law may be divided into
four different parts, which are discussed below.
10. Mexican Foreign Trade Law, supra note 2, art. 14.
11. GATT, supra note 1, Antidumping Code.
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1. Denunciation by Affected Parties or by Decision of SECOFI
Usually the AD procedure starts with a complaint to SECOFI by the
Mexican industrialist affected by the importation of goods into Mexico
under dumping conditions. Mexican Foreign Trade Law requires that
companies representing more than twenty-five percent of the national
production of the goods involved in the investigation, or a chamber or
similar organization that represents the industry of such products, file
the complaint with SECOFI.
An example of a complaint is that filed on July 19, 1989, by the
Asociaci6n Nacional de la Industria Quimica, A.C., against exportations
from the United States of "fibra acrilica" made by Monsanto and
Cyanamid International Sales Corporation. 2
According to the GATT Antidumping Code, 3 the request for inves-
tigation must be made by a majority of the producers of the product
which is imported under dumping conditions. As mentioned earlier, this
requirement will prevail in the case of imports from Canada and the
United States; therefore, a majority of the producers will be required in
order to file a claim, not the twenty-five percent as required by the
Mexican Foreign Trade Law. The AD Code requires that the claim refer
to the difference in price as well as to the proof that the importation
of the products under dumping conditions causes severe damage to the
Mexican industry or that it affects the establishment of new industry.
Once SECOFI receives the claim within five days it may: (1) start the
administrative investigation by imposing a duty; (2) start with the ad-
ministrative investigation without imposing a duty; or (3) reject the claim,
giving the factual and legal grounds for doing so.
2. Starting the Investigation
SECOFI may begin the administrative investigation with or without
imposing a provisional duty. The commencement of an administrative
investigation must be published in the official gazette in order to permit
importers, exporters, representatives of foreign governments, or any third
parties with a legal interest in the result of the investigation to file their
arguments in order to protect their rights. In the event that SECOFI
imposes a provisional countervailing duty at the start of the investigation,
it has a six-month period either to cancel the provisional duty if the
result of the investigation shows that no dumping occurred, to establish
a definitive countervailing duty at the same or different level from the
provisional duty established at the start of the investigation, or to terminate
the investigation canceling the provisional duty.
If a provisional duty is established at the start of the investigation,
SECOFI may authorize the importation of the goods under investigation
without the payment of a countervailing duty, provided that the importer
12. DIARIO OFICLAL DE LA FEDERAcI6N, Sept. 25, 1989.
13. GATT, supra note 1, Antidumping Code.
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posts a bond which guarantees payment of the duties and interest for
the following twelve months. If the provisional duty is confirmed by a
definitive duty, the Ministry of Finance may collect the duties from the
importations which were made during the period of investigation and
which were secured by the bond.
Calculation of the interest charges, penalties, and so on, are referred
by the Mexican Foreign Trade Law to the tax laws. 14 Because there are
no specific rules for this purpose, many problems of interpretation re-
garding the payment of AD duties in these circumstances have occurred.
For example, under the tax laws the interest on a past due tax is limited
to one year, without the imposition of sanctions if the payment is
voluntarily made. The question is whether, in case of the confirmation
by SECOFI of the provisional duty, the payment by the importer as a
result thereof is voluntary or not.
Article 11 of the GATT AD Code 5 establishes the possibility that
under certain circumstances, SECOFI may establish an antidumping duty
retroactively to the date of which the provisional measures were estab-
lished. Under the Mexican Constitution, a law may not be applied ret-
roactively against the will of the affected person.' 6 The debatable question
is whether Article 11 of the GATT Antidumping Code provides for
retroactive application or not, as the duties were already established by
the provisional decision.
Coming back to the investigative procedure, SECOFI must review the
representative period of the dumping, which period may not be less than
six months. In contrast to the United States system, SECOFI is the
agency that decides the existence of dumping and the amount of damage
caused. In the United States, on the other hand, the Commerce De-
partment establishes whether a product is being sold under its normal
price and the International Trade Commission determines the damage
caused to the industry.
3. Termination of the AD Procedure
The AD Procedure may be terminated for three reasons: (1) lack of
elements for the existence of a dumping practice; (2) an agreement is
reached between the exporters and SECOFI; or (3) the imposition of a
final AD duty.
a. Lack of Elements For the Existence of a Dumping Practice
If SECOFI finds that there was no price discrimination, no injury or
likelihood of injury, or no relationship between the above-mentioned
elements, it will terminate the investigation and cancel the provisional
duty if it was established at the start of the investigation. There have
been many cases in Mexico which began with the imposition of a pro-
14. Mexican Foreign Trade Law, supra note 2, art. 11.
15. GATT, supra note 1, Antidumping Code art. 11.
16. MEx. CONST. art. 14.
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visional duty but that were ultimately canceled at the end of the inves-
tigation.
b. Agreement Between the Exporters and SECOFI
According to Mexican Foreign Trade Law, SECOFI may hold con-
ciliatory meetings with importers, exporters, foreign governments, and
any other interested parties. The investigation may terminate if the ex-
porters commit themselves before SECOFI to terminate their dumping
practice in their exports to Mexico. There have been approximately four
cases in Mexico that were terminated for this reason. 7
c. The Imposition of a Final AD Duty
If SECOFI finds the existence of a dumping practice and that damage
has been suffered, it shall send the matter to the Commission of Duties
for Foreign Trade (Comision de Aranceles y Controles al Comercio
Exterior), and the Commission will establish the final AD duty. Entities
represented in this Commission include: the Undersecretary of Foreign
Trade of SECOFI; three representatives of the Ministry of Finance; one
representative of the Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulic Resources;
the General Director of duties of SECOFI; and the General Director of
Foreign Trade of SECOFI. Once the definitive duty is established by
such a Commission, it will be published in the official gazette.
4. SECOFI is Obligated by the Foreign Trade Law
SECOFI is obligated by the Foreign Trade Law to review the level of
the AD duty every year after the date of its final determination. At any
time after the imposition of the final duty, any interested party may
request a review of the level of such AD duty. An importer of products
may file a request for review (recurso de revocacion) with SECOFI for
it to review the file in order to decide whether the imposition of the
AD duty was properly established by the corresponding authority within
SECOFI. The request for review must be filed within forty-five working
days after the final determination. If SECOFI rejects the request for
review filed by the importers, the importers may file a nullity action
before the Fiscal Court (Tribunal Fiscal de la Federacion) within forty-
five days after SECOFI's final resolution denying the request.
The Tax Court is an administrative court created primarily to review
claims of private parties regarding decisions by the tax authorities. It
was, however, also given the authority to review AD and CVD decisions
of SECOFI.
The final decision of the Fiscal Court may be challenged before a
Constitutional Court (Tribunal Colegiado de Circuito) within fifteen days
after the final resolution by the Tax Court.
17. See, e.g., Industria de Baleros Intercontinental, S.A. de C.V. and Rodamientos Conicos,
S.A. de C.V. vs. Nippon Seido KK, Nach., Fujicoch, Corp., NTN Togo Bearing Co. Ltd. and
Koyo Co. Ltd., Di.A4o OrIcItL O LA FEDERACt6N, June 25, 1990 (regarding ballbearings originating
in Japan).
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It is important to note that under Mexican law, only the importer has
the right to challenge the imposition of an antidumping duty. This right
is not available to any other party such as the exporter, consumers, or
competitors.
As established in the AD Code, the government of the country of the
exporter that is affected by the imposition of an antidumping duty may
file an action against the government that imposed the duty, before a
GATT Committee based in Geneva, Switzerland.
Article 14 of the AD Code establishes the procedure for this action.
There is a Mexican case in which the United States government brought
this type of action against Mexico and GATT decided that the AD duty
was not properly imposed and was therefore declared null and void.,8
D. Subsidies
Mexican Foreign Trade Law defines a subsidy as the unfair practice
by a foreign government or its public entities of granting directly, or
indirectly, incentives, premiums, subsidies, or help of any other nature
to producers, transformers, traders, or exporters of merchandise that is
exported into Mexico, with the purpose of strengthening in an unequitable
manner its international competitiveness.
As mentioned earlier, Mexico is not a part of the GATT Subsidies
Code. Mexico, however, ratified the Agreement for the Interpretation
and Application of Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of GATT, which lists
in a nonexclusive manner which acts are considered to be subsidies granted
by governments. In Mexico there has been only one such case in which
the Mexican Government imposed a countervailing duty (CVD) against
exports into Mexico on aluminum from Venezuela. 19 Although the au-
thorities imposed a provisional duty at the beginning of the investigation,
the final resolution which concluded the investigation canceled the CVD
provisional duty and did not impose one definitively. The procedure for
the imposition of the duties, and the defenses against the same, are
identical to the ones previously described for the AD cases. Therefore,
it is not necessary to review this procedure.
II. DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN ANTIDUMPING (AD) AND
COUNTERVAILING DUTY (CVD) CASES UNDER NAFTA
As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the NAFTA negotiations
have retained the same solution as that of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade
Agreement ("FTA") in that each country will apply its own AD and
CVD Laws, but in a form consistent with the provisions of NAFTA.
The provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement on Review
18. JORGE WALKER & GERARRO JARAmILLO, EL REGIMEN JURIDICO DEL COMERCIO EXTERIOR DE
MEXICO DEL GATT AL TRATADO DE LmR COMERCIo 127 (1991) (legal structure of Mexican Foreign
Trade from GATT to the North American Free Trade Agreement).
19. Aluminiol S.A. de C.V. v. Venezolana de Aluminio, C.A. y Aluminio del Caroni, S.A.
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of AD and CVD Matters20 have been heavily influenced by the provisions
of the FTA agreement, and some new aspects hopefully were enriched
by Mexico's participation in the negotiations. I will analyze the system
under the new draft of NAFTA and will make reference to Mexican AD
and CVD Laws.
A. Retention of Domestic AD Law and CVD Law
Each party reserves the right to apply its own AD and CVD laws to
goods imported from the territory of any of the other parties. AD laws
and CVD laws include, as appropriate for each party, the relevant status,
legislative history, regulations, administrative practice, and judicial pre-
cedents. The first question that arises under Mexican law is which of
the legal provisions referred to are applicable in Mexico. As previously
described, the Mexican legal system includes only the relevant status,
regulations, and, to a certain degree, judicial precedents, but does not
include legislative history and the administrative practice.
Each party reserves the right to change or modify its AD law or CVD
law, provided that in the case of an amendment to a party's AD or
CVD statute:
(1) such amendment shall apply to goods of the other parties only if
it is specified in the amendment that it will apply to the other parties;
(2) the amending party notifies the other parties in writing of the
amendment as far in advance of the date of enactment of such statute
as possible;
(3) following notification, the amending party, upon the request of
any other party to which the amendment may apply, must consult with
the other party prior to the enactment of the amending statute; and
(4) such amendment, as it applies to any of the other parties, is not
inconsistent with the GATT AD Code or Subsidies Code, the succeeding
codes entered into by the original parties to NAFTA, or the object and
purpose of NAFTA and its chapter on AD and CVD, which is to establish
fair and predictable conditions for the progressive liberalization of trade
between the parties to the Agreement.
B. Review of Statutory Amendments
1. Referral for a Declaratory Opinion
A party to which an amendment of another party's AD law or CVD
law will be applied may request in writing that such amendment be
referred to a binational panel for a declaratory opinion as to whether:
(1) the amendment does not conform to GATT, its Codes, and NAFTA;
or (2) such amendment has the function and effect of overturning a
prior decision of a panel and does not conform to GATT, its Codes,
and NAFTA. 21
20. NAFrA, supra note 3, ch. 19.
21. Id. art. 1903(1)(a) & (b).
[Vol. 1
UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES
2. Modifications to the Amending Statute
In the event that the panel recommends modifications to the amending
statute in order to remedy a non-conformity that it has identified in its
opinion, two possibilities exist:
(1) Both parties shall immediately begin consultations and shall seek
to achieve a mutually satisfactory solution to the matter within ninety
days of the issuance of the panel's final declaratory opinion. Such solution
may include seeking remedial legislation with respect to the statute of
the amending party.
(2) If remedial legislation is not enacted within nine months from the
end of the ninety day consultation period referred to in (1) above, and
no other agreement has been reached, the party that requested the panel
may either take comparable legislative or equivalent executive action, or
terminate the Agreement with respect to the party that made the amend-
ment, upon sixty days notice to the other party.2
C. Review of Fiscal AD and CVD Determinations
The parties shall replace judicial review of final AD and CVD deter-
mination with binational panel review. Under Mexican law the question
arises whether the judicial review is the one made by SECOFI, the Federal
Tax Tribunal (Tribunal Fiscal de la Federaci6n) or by the court (Tribunal
Colegiado de Circuito) that is in charge of reviewing decisions of the
Fiscal Tribunal. The Fiscal Tribunal is an administrative tribunal and is
therefore not part of the judiciary. Strictly speaking, the panel's review
would be of the Fiscal Tribunal determination, although the intention
of NAFTA is for the panel to review the SECOFI decision, since it is
the determination of the competent investigating authority that is under
review.
An implicated party may request a panel review, based upon the
administrative record, of a final AD or CVD determination by a competent
investigation authority of one of the parties to decide whether such
determination was in accordance with the AD or CVD law of the importing
party. The panel shall apply the standard established in the Agreement
and the general legal principles that a court of the importing party would
otherwise apply to a review of a determination of the competent inves-
tigating authority. The request for a panel review shall be made in writing
to the other party within thirty days from the date of publication or
notification of the final determination.
An implicated party may request a panel where the importing party
has imposed provisional measures. An implicated party may request a
review on its own initiative or upon the request of a person who would
be entitled to request the review under the law of the importing party.
Where both implicated parties request a panel to review a final deter-
22. Id. art. 1904.
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mination, a single panel shall review that determination. The competent
investigating authority and the parties that would have standing in a
domestic judicial review may appear before the panel.
The panel may uphold a final determination or remand it for action
consistent with the panel's decision. The decision of a panel shall be
binding on the implicated parties. The Agreement shall not affect judicial
review with respect to determinations other than final determinations. A
final determination shall not be reviewed under any judicial review pro-
cedures of the importing party if an implicated party requests a panel.
Neither party shall provide for an appeal from a panel decision to its
domestic courts in its domestic legislation.
It is obvious that the Mexican AD law will have to be amended so
that a panel may review the final decisions of SECOFI in AD and CVD
matters, if an implicated party or a person who would be entitled to a
review requests the establishment of a panel under Article 1904 of the
Agreement.
The implementation of a decision by the Mexican authorities in com-
pliance with a final determination of a panel established under these
circumstances may be challenged by the affected person in Mexico with
a constitutional Writ of Amparo procedure. The NAFTA treaty may not
limit a right which is established by the Mexican Constitution. As men-
tioned earlier, under the Mexican Constitution an international treaty that
violates the Constitution is not considered the supreme law of the country.
The panel review shall not apply where implicated parties do not seek
panel review of a final determination. An implicated party may request
the review of a panel decision by an extraordinary challenge procedure
if a member of the panel was guilty of misconduct, the panel departed
from fundamental rules of procedure, or the panel manifestly exceeded
its powers, and if any of these actions materially affected the panel's
decisions .23
To implement the provisions of Article 1904 of the Agreement,2 the
parties shall agree on rules of procedure by January 1, 1994, and shall
include, among other provisions, that the decision by the panel must be
rendered within 315 days from the date on which a request for a panel
is made. The parties shall, in order to achieve the objectives of Article
1904 of the Agreement, 5 amend their statutes and regulations as necessary
with respect to AD or CVD involving goods of the other parties. 26 In
particular, the parties shall:
(1) amend their laws to ensure that paid duties and their interest shall
be reimbursed if the decision of the panel decides to do so;
(2) amend their laws so that their courts recognize sanctions imposed
by the laws of the other parties concerning commitments of confidentiality
23. Id. art. 1904(13)(a) & annex 1904(13).
24. Id. art. 1904.
25. Id.
26. Id. art. 1904(14).
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and privileged information assumed in the panel procedures. 27 This pro-
vision is interesting because parties must include in their laws provisions
that will recognize the application of foreign laws in their own territory
regarding sanctions for violation of confidentiality commitments; and
(3) shall amend internal laws to prevent parties from initiating judicial
procedures before the expiration of the deadline to establish a panel.
Before starting a judicial procedure against a final determination, the
party or private party shall inform and send a notification to the implicated
parties ten days before the expiration of a deadline to establish a panel.2 1
D. Safeguard to the System of Review Before a PaneP9
The following procedure was not established under the U.S.-Canada
FTA and is an improvement of the system. If one party considers that
another party is interfering with the establishment procedures or en-
forcement decision of a panel, it may request consultations with the other
party. If the matter is not resolved within forty-five days from the request
for consultations, the requesting party may request the establishment of
a special committee. If the request is accepted by the special committee,
the defendant and claimant must carry out consultations to resolve the
dispute within sixty days. If no mutually satisfactory solution is reached
within this period, the claimant may suspend application of Article 1904
(regarding panel jurisdiction over AD and CVD decisions) or suspend
benefits under the Agreement against the other party as the circumstances
may dictate. If a claimant decides to suspend the application of Article
1904, a defendant may do the same.30
The defending party in the procedure before the special committee
may, at any time, request that the special committee decide whether the
suspension of benefits to the other party is excessive and whether it has
corrected the problems confirmed by the decision of the special committee.
The special committee will render its decision within forty-five days. If
the claim is successful, the suspension of benefits and/or suspension of
Article 1904 will be canceled.
E. Final Determina:ions3'
The provision of the NAFTA chapter on AD and CVD will be applied
only in the future to final determinations after the entry into force of
the Agreement.
F. Consultations32
The parties will make consultations annually or upon the request of
one of the parties in order to examine any problems regarding the
execution or operation of the AD and CVD provisions and to recommend
27. Id. art. 1904(15).
28. Id. art. 1904(15)(a), (b), (c)(i), & (c)(ii).
29. Id. art. 1905.
30. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
31. NAFTA, supra note 3, art. 1906.
32. Id. art. 1907.
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appropriate solutions. The parties will make consultations about the
feasibility of developing more effective rules on the use of subsidies. The
investigating authorities will make consultations yearly upon the request
of any party and will eventually provide information to the Commission.
In light of these consultations, the parties agreed that it is desirable
in applying AD and CVD Laws:
- to publish the initiation of an investigation in the official gazette;
- to notify the deadlines for filing information;
- to grant written instructions regarding requested information from
interested parties;
- to provide reasonable access to information;
- to grant opportunity to file proofs and arguments;
- to protect confidential information;
- to prepare files to include recommendations for official consulting
bodies;
- to provide the relevant information upon which provisional or final
decisions were based;
- to base the final resolutions in law and merits; and
- to base the final resolutions in law and merits with regard to the
material damage affecting the national industry and the material inter-
ference with the establishment of national industry.
The above mentioned points shall not guide the decision of the panels
in resolving the question of whether or not a decision was based on the
AD or CVD law of the importing party.
G. Secretariat33
The parties will establish a section within the Secretariat established
by the Agreement in order to facilitate the operation of the provisions
regarding AD and CVD. The secretaries of the Secretariat will support
all decisions of the panels and special committees. Each section will
receive and file all the applications and correspondence related to the
procedures of a panel or special committee. Each section will send to
the Secretariat of the other implicated party copies of all official doc-
uments and correspondence received and filed in its office related to the
panel or special committee proceeding, with the exception of the ad-
ministrative file.
The remuneration of panelists, members of special committees, and
their assistance will be shared by the implicated parties proportionally.
The commission will fix the amount of renumeration to be paid to the
panelists and members of the special committees.
H. Code of Conduct 3 4
The parties will establish, at the latest, by the date of entry into force
of the Agreement, a code of conduct to be followed by the panelists
and members of the special committees.
33. Id. art. 1908.
34. Id. art. 1909.
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CONCLUSION
Once NAFTA comes into effect, Mexico will have to amend its internal
AD and CVD laws as previously described. Although NAFTA establishes
the permanent application of AD and CVD laws in the three countries,
the legal systems within the area will move closer together over time,
and one day Mexico, Canada, and the United States will have similar
laws in AD and CVD matters. The complexity of the AD and CVD
chapters of the NAFTA draft, and of the internal laws on the subject,
will require a detailed analysis by lawyers of the three jurisdictions, once
the Agreement comes into effect, in order to understand fully all of its
implications.

COMMENTS ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF U.S.
UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICE LAW: MISSED
OPPORTUNITIES IN NAFTA
LESLIE GLICK*
My topic is one about which I have particularly strong feelings; con-
sequently, I probably should begin with a disclaimer, as my views are
not necessarily objective. Since 1979, I have represented Mexican exporters
into the United States. I have been involved in numerous Mexican coun-
tervailing duty cases involving textiles, bricks, tiles, polypropylene film,
and other goods. I have represented the CYDSA Group, LEMOSA, and
Industrias Monterrey. I have represented clients in antidumping cases on
fresh-cut flowers and circular welded pipe and tube. Therefore, my views
are those of a practitioner who has represented Mexican companies on
one end of the U.S. countervailing and antidumping laws. I have seen
particular abuses and problems with the law that we had hoped might
be resolved in the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"),'
but in many cases were not.
There are many procedural problems with the American unfair trade
laws that make them particularly onerous when applied to developing
countries such as Mexico. I, along with others, had hoped that NAFTA
would address, at the minimum, the procedural aspects of the antidumping
and countervailing duty laws to achieve some level of harmonization and
procedural due process.
I have testified on behalf of Mexican clients at various hearings before
the Office of the United States International Trade Commission and the
United States Trade Representative to request changes in the antidumping
laws. These include relatively simple procedural changes, such as reform
of the lengthy and complex antidumping questionnaires, which are difficult
to understand even if English is your native language. They are almost
impossible to understand if Spanish is your native language. I do not
understand why these questionnaires cannot be simplified and translated
into the language of the country of the people who must answer them.
Very often the time limits for responses are relatively short and companies
that do not answer in time have been penalized by being excluded from
submitting information.
* Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, Washington, D.C.; Author, UNDERSTANDING THE NORTH
AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (1993); GUIDE TO U.S. CUSTOMS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LAWS (1984), and MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (1984); Adjunct Professor of Law, University
of Baltimore School of Law, 1989-90; B.A and J.D., Cornell University; admitted to bars of New
York and D.C. (1971).
1. Oct. 7, 1992 draft, U.S.-Can.-Mex. [hereinafter NAFTA].
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This brings me to what I consider one of the most unfair elements
in the American dumping law, the "best information available" rule.'
This rule literally allows the U.S. Commerce Department to throw out
an entire questionnaire response of a foreign respondent and use separate
data which may contain either information from the petition or infor-
mation from another exporter. If an exporter fails to comply with any
of the procedural requirements, the questionnaire may be thrown out.
An exporter may only be a day late in answering the questionnaire, or
he may have had some problems with the computer presentation that
must be submitted to the Commerce Department. The "best information
available" rule is a very powerful tool and, in my view, it has been
abused. Often the Commerce Department applies it in a punitive way
and uses what is not really the best information, but rather penalizes
Mexican and other exporters from developing countries because of their
less sophisticated finance and accounting practices. Companies in these
countries often do not have the record-keeping facilities and access to
other types of information that the Commerce Department is accustomed
to.
I have represented a number of companies in the Mexican agricultural
sector. Many of these companies in the past did not have to pay income
tax under Mexican law, but rather only a sales tax. Therefore, they never
kept records for things such as depreciation. For example, Mexican flower
producers, who are often rural ranchers, typically keep their records of
cash sales on scrap pieces of paper. Nevertheless, the U.S. Commerce
Department applies Generally Accepted Accounting Procedures ("GAAP")
to them.
I remember my first visit to Mexico, a verification investigation, in
the countervailing duty case on fresh cut flowers from Mexico back in
1984.1 I think the Commerce Department people were a little surprised
when we drove for two or three miles down dirt roads in Baja, California,
to get to the so-called office of the Mexican producer. The office did
not even have electricity or phones, just a gasoline-operated generator.
The question that I pose is should these kinds of producers be treated
in the same way as Hatachi or Nissan Steel? American antidumping law
does not make any distinction about how big you are, your level of
development, or your type of industry. It has one questionnaire, one set
of rules, and very little flexibility for developing countries.
In my opinion, the American antidumping and countervailing duty
laws have been unduly harsh in their application to Mexico and have,
themselves, become a non-tariff barrier. They will remain a non-tariff
barrier under NAFTA because this issue was not adequately addressed.
This is an argument that I and others made to the United States gov-
ernment during the NAFTA review process.
2. This is a procedural practice of the U.S. Department of Commerce. See 19 C.F.R. § 353.37
(1991).
3. See Fresh Cut Flowers From Mexico, 49 Fed. Reg. 500 (1984) (final negative countervailing
duty determination).
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The answer that was given by the government-admittedly, a not
altogether unreasonable answer-was that changes under the antidumping
and countervailing duty rules should be part of the negotiations under
the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade ("GATT").' Consequently,
this is a multilateral issue and should be dealt with in a multilateral
context, not in terms of a bilateral or trilateral agreement such as NAFTA.
There is some logic to this.
The flaw with this, however, is that many issues are being dealt with
in a trilateral context in NAFTA that differ from the treatment that
other countries will get under GATT. Why not antidumping and coun-
tervailing duty rules? Even if the United States did not want to address
the substantive issues, why not at least harmonize the procedures, the
forms of the questionnaires, the time limits, and the definitions of what
is the "best information available." I believe that there are many areas
where there could have at least been an effort to move toward some
type of harmonization, more openness, and more due process than the
antidumping and countervailing duty procedures now provide. Unfor-
tunately, I think this opportunity was missed.
Many of the U.S. Commerce Department rules in the United States
on antidumping and countervailing duties are unpublished and unwritten.
The amount of discretion in their administration is almost unbridled.
The United States Court of International Trade has given the Commerce
Department a fairly free hand to interpret their own rules and to make
policies. I feel that the failure to address this issue in NAFTA was a
major mistake.
As is well known, the filing of unfair trade practice cases alone often
has a chilling effect on trade and commerce. Dumping and countervailing
duty cases in America are very easy to bring. The cost for the American
producer is very minimal. All he has to do is put together a petition
and file it with the International Trade Administration of the Commerce
Department and the International Trade Commission. If he meets a
minimal standard of compliance with the rules, all of the different work
and the investigations are done by the American government. It is the
foreign respondents and their lawyers that have all of the expense of
answering the questionnaires and of participating in the verifications. So
the procedures themselves, sometimes, are as costly and onerous as the
penalties. I have seen cases where very high antidumping or countervailing
duty rates were imposed, not because the exporters were engaged in unfair
trade practices, but because they could not afford to participate fully in
the lengthy and costly proceedings in the United States. This to me is
something that, in the long run, needs to be addressed if NAFTA is
really to be successful in promoting freer trade. You cannot have freer
trade if a large amount of antidumping or countervailing duty cases are
4. Apr. 10, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, reprinted in BASIC DocUnMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
LAW 3 (Stephen Zamora & Ronald A. Brand eds., 1990).
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being brought against each country, under three different laws and sets
of rules.
For many years countervailing duty cases in the United States were a
major obstacle to exports into Mexico. Mexico did, in fact, have a
number of subsidy (estimulas) programs. Mexico, however, is a developing
country and many of these programs were designed to help foster de-
velopment. The fact that Mexico was not a signatory to the GATT
Subsidies Code, and had not adopted substantially similar obligations,
meant that there was no injury test applied by the United States Inter-
national Trade Commission to Mexican exports for many years. All
American businesses had to do was to allege a subsidy and show that
it existed to prove a sufficient basis for a countervailing duty. This
eventually changed after Mexico adopted rules similar to the GATT
S u idies Code. For many years programs such as the Certificados de
Devolucion ("CEDI's"),S now abolished, were considered export-oriented
programs. Many exporters in Mexico received the CEDI's. At one point,
as many as eighteen or twenty countervailing duty orders were outstanding
against Mexico. There are other programs, however, such as the CEPROFI
Program, which have been held subject to countervailing duty orders.
The CEPROFI program, which is still in existence, provides a domestic
tax incentive that is not clearly related to exports, but under the test
applied by the Commerce Department and the Court of International
Trade it has been held countervailable depending on the general availability
or on how it was applied.6
The more recent countervailing duty cases against Mexico have even
included such programs as the Programaide Importaciones Temporal
("PITEX") Program. The United States takes a somewhat ambiguous
position on PITEX. It does not countervail against raw materials physically
incorporated into the exported product from Mexico, but it does counter-
vail against the exports of equipment and machinery that are used to
make these products, even though the machinery is eventually re-exported.
This is a distinction that in my mind is somewhat questionable. Many
Mexican companies have criticized the American countervailing duty law
as being somewhat hypocritical because many of the programs in Mexico
that are attacked as subsidies exist in a similar form in the United States.
The United States has an extensive program of foreign subsidies. It has
various temporary importation schemes and government-assisted financing
programs, many of which are similar to Mexico.7 This has never been
an issue, though, under the American countervailing duty laws. The fact
that American products are subsidized does not prevent an American
company from bringing an action against Mexico for doing something
similar. Again, NAFTA does not really address these issues.
5. See Leslie A. Glick, Doing Business in Mexico. 1 34.03, , 1.
6. Id. § 34.03, 3.
7. For example, financing by the Export Import Bank, and agricultural subsidies targeted to
certain industries.
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There are also problems with the safeguard provisions in NAFTA.8
Given the tariff reductions and eliminations of trade barriers, it is not
unreasonable to expect that there may be some surges in imports. To
remedy any harm that may occur from such surges in imports, the
Agreement provides for safeguards both on a bilateral and a global basis.
For example, suppose that due to a significant reduction or elimination
of a duty in the Agreement, a NAFTA country, such as Mexico exports
into another NAFTA country, such as the United States, a product in
such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause serious
injury or threat of injury to a domestic industry producing a like or
competitive product. The United States could then, in order to prevent
this injury and after certain procedural requirements are met, suspend
the further reduction of any rate of duty provided for under NAFTA
for such goods, or increase the rate of duty on such goods to a level
not to exceed the most favored nation rate applied at the time the action
is taken.
This is an example of a bilateral safeguard. These apply to emergency
actions taken against surges of imports that result from tariff reductions
under NAFTA. The bilateral safeguards may only be taken once, and
for a maximum period of three years. In cases of extremely sensitive
goods, the safeguard may be extended to a fourth year. The global
safeguards operate in the same manner as the bilateral safeguards, but
apply to import surges to all countries, not just NAFTA countries. In
essence, where a NAFTA partner undertakes a safeguard action on a
global basis, according to Article XIX of GATT each NAFTA partner
must be excluded from the action unless its exports account for a sub-
stantial share of total imports of the goods in question and contribute
importantly to the serious injury or threat thereof. The Agreement provides
that a NAFTA country normally will not be considered accountable for
a substantial share of total imports unless it falls among the top five
suppliers of the good.
There were some other alternatives discussed during the negotiations.
At one time, the United States had proposed using a tariff rate quota
mechanism instead of safeguards. This was ultimately not accepted. The
safeguard provisions under the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement
("FTA") 9 are similar to, though not the same as, the ones under NAFTA.
Most experts agree that as far as bilateral safeguards are concerned,
NAFTA is probably somewhat less stringent than the provisions under
the FTA. NAFTA states that the emergency safeguard should be used
to the minimum extent necessary to remedy or prevent injury.'0
Some may find it somewhat hypocritical for the governments totally
to eliminate tariffs on the one hand and then impose safeguards on the
8. See NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 8 (Emergency Actions).
9. Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., reprinted in BAsic DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL EcoNOMIc LAW
353 (Stephen Zamora & Ronald A. Brand eds., 1990).
10. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 801(1).
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other. It is like simultaneously giving and taking away. People are creating
an expectation that NAFTA is going to eliminate duties, but there is
not much publicity about the fact that the safeguard provisions can put
the duties back on.
There also is, however, a political problem. President Bush never would
have obtained the fast track authorization from Congress for the NAFTA
negotiations unless he promised to include safeguard provisions. American
domestic industries were very much concerned about surges of imports
from Mexico. Safeguards are necessary evils, even though they somewhat
denigrate the nature of the Agreement as a truly free trade agreement.
On the other hand, they deal with some of the fears and concerns of
U.S. domestic industries and labor unions. There has to be some device
to control these possibly unfair surges in imports, and the safeguard
mechanism is one way to do it.
The last issue I will address is the review of the antidumping and
countervailing duty cases through the special panels that are provided by
NAFTA. 1 As under the FTA, NAFTA provides for binational panels
that will substitute for domestic judicial review. The main difference is
that the panels are permanent under NAFTA while they were only
temporary under the FTA. The panels will be comprised of five indi-
viduals, with each country selecting two panelists and the fifth panelist
being selected by the remaining country. The panel must apply the
domestic law of the importing country. It can either uphold the deter-
mination of the administrative agency or remand it to the administrative
authority for further action.
One difference in NAFTA that was not in the FTA is the procedure
for the so-called special committee. This committee is composed of three
members who are chosen from a fifteen-person roster comprised of judges
or former judges of any federal or judicial court in the United States,
Canada, or Mexico. If the application of another party's domestic law
prevents the establishment of a panel, if another party's domestic law
prevents a panel from rendering a final decision, or if another party's
domestic law results in failure to provide for judicial or panel review,
this special committee may impose certain sanctions against the offending
country. It may recommend, for example, a suspension of benefits under
NAFTA against one of the parties.
In conclusion, the coverage of unfair trade practices in NAFTA is not
as extensive as it could have been. On the other hand, we have made
a beginning. There has at least been a dialogue on these issues. We have
established reviewing mechanisms. It is my hope that the countries will
continue, through different working panels, to move towards the day
when there is a complete harmonization of the regulations, and maybe
11. Id. art. 1901(2), annex 1901(2) (Establishment of Binational Panels) and annex 1903.2 (Panel
Procedures under Article 1903).
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even of the substantive provisions of the dumping and countervailing
duty laws in the three countries. This would really facilitate the free
movement of goods and services between the countries.

COMMENTS ON UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES
MICHAEL W. GORDON*
I would like to take a look at the areas of dumping subsidies and
safeguards under the escape clause of the North American Free Trade
Agreement ("NAFTA").' From time to time, I will put this in the context
of the sneaker industry in Mexico, Brazil, and Italy and the footwear
manufacturers in Taiwan, and take a look at how NAFTA attempts to
treat Mexico as a special case in that industry.
These areas-subsidies, countervailing duties, dumping, and the safe-
guards-are highly restricted in terms of what NAFTA can do because
these are areas which are already outlined in GATT.' There are relatively
few areas in NAFTA which are not restricted because of the GATT,
such as investments and service areas, where GATT is attempting to
govern but has failed to do so. Thus, NAFTA is a little freer to work
with in those areas. Finally, NAFTA is very free in the areas of specific
industries, which GATT does not make any serious attempt to govern.
I would like to see the dumping rules abolished totally in the United
States. Having been trained partially as an economist, I am not at all
convinced that it is appropriate to attack dumping. In the case of a
manufacturer of footwear, we are going after manufacturers, private
individuals, who are selling goods in the United States at less than fair
value.
It seems that the U.S. dumping law has two functions. One is to
provide a basis to attack the alleged evil of dumping and to correct it
through bringing dumping actions. If we can prove sales at less than
fair value, we ought to be able to impose antidumping duties. One of
the problems with that approach is the difficulty of applying the mech-
anism of the dumping rules. There are significant difficulties in calculating
dumping, and there are a number of horror stories arising from it. One
example deals with woodwind pads for woodwind instruments. The gov-
ernment could not find the exact same size pads, so they used one of
another size from another woodwind instrument, found a very narrow
margin of dumping, but nevertheless went ahead and applied dumping
duties. We do not really need that kind of action.
The second function is the use of dumping, which also applies to
subsidies, as a protective measure to coerce the parties to sit down and
talk about accepting a voluntary restraint agreement which is not at all
* Professor of Law, University of Florida School of Law, Gainesville; Of Counsel, Ogarrio
y Diaz Mexico City; Co-Editor, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS (Am. Casebook Series, 1991);
B.S. and J.D., University of Connecticut; M.A., Trinity College, Ireland; Dip]. de Droit Compare,
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covered in the law. Thus, we have these complex rules of dumping and
subsidies and escape clause provisions where what we really end up with,
with steel, electronics, and so many other products, is a negotiated
agreement, or voluntary restraint agreement ("VRA"). Why don't we
simply say, "When there is a problem with trade, let's get the parties
to sit down and talk about measures to be taken. Let's have a VRA."
I suspect there will be more dumping cases brought, both by Mexico
against the United States, and by the United States against Mexico. A
good many of them will be under the second category, where they are
brought really as a trade barrier. To date, there have been fourteen cases
of dumping brought by the United States against Mexico and fifteen
brought by Mexico against the United States. There has been relatively
little use of the rules against subsidies.
Before 1985, there were a number of cases brought by the United
States against Mexico, some twenty-nine based on subsidies, but Mexico
has begun to dismantle its subsidization program substantially . I do not
believe that there have been any cases brought since that time. It is
interesting how we spend so much time thinking of complex rules for
a small number of cases, when we really have not addressed the issue
of how we are going to provide harmonization of rules dealing with the
settlement of private commercial disputes. There are some provisions in
NAFTA for private investment disputes, and I think that is extremely
healthy.
GATT has made some proposals in both the dumping and subsidies
area.4 GATT has had a difficult time, however, in reaching any conclusion.
The GATT negotiators remind me of economists; if you lay all of them
end to end, they would not reach a conclusion. There are two sides in
the dumping issues. One is the importers' side, which the United States
tends to take, and that is where they would like to have harder rules.
The United States is concerned with companies that change the nature
of the product, just a little bit, after a dumping claim has been brought
against them, so they will not be challenged again, or must be challenged
for the problems with the modified product. Canada and Mexico are
more likely to take the position of the exporter, which wants changes
in the dumping rules making it easier to measure dumping, and probably
to increase the de minimus, substantially.
The subsidies proposal has also come to a point where we have no
real final determination. We have a view that certain subsidies should
be prohibited. The United States likes that. Certain subsidies should be
permissible, but actionable, and certain ones permissible and not action-
able. The United States is stuck on that. How do we solve all of this?
One way perhaps would be the European Community approach, in which
there are no internal dumping or subsidy actions.
3. NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 1115-38.
4. Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Ne-
gotiations, UR-91-0185, GATT Secretariat (Dec. 20, 1991).
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I believe we eventually will see dumping and countervailing duty laws
somewhat harmonized. NAFTA does not address a great deal with the
subsidy and dumping rules. It does address dispute resolution. Also, there
is a substantial protection in the safeguard area. The difficulty is that
GATT requires any protective action to be taken against all GATT
members. If we now have a surge of sneakers coming from all of those
nations that I mentioned including Mexico, what do we do with Mexico?
In subsidies you are going after the subsidizing nation; in dumping you
are going after the company that has dumped. But in a response under
the escape clause provision of Section 201, which picks up on Article
19 of GATT, you must go against all nations. The process that has been
chosen in NAFTA is to have a transitory provision; you may only go
against other NAFTA parties for a period of ten years.' Presumably,
the way the language reads, at the end of that ten years, no more
safeguard actions will be permissible against Mexico. One might look at
this and conclude that you fall back solely on the use of GATT.
Essentially we have said in NAFTA that when we are going against
the sneaker industry we will exclude Mexico unless Mexico is a party
that, considered individually, accounts for a substantial share of those
imports of the sneakers. So we are essentially trying to move Mexico
and Canada out of the ambit of GATT. This is interesting because this
is exactly what we have argued for in GATT. The United States would
like to be able to target countries specifically. If Brazil is giving us
trouble with a surge of footwear imports, we do not want to have to
go against Italy. Under the U.S. escape clause version, however, we
must. So what we have been unable to achieve in multilateral negotiation,
we have been able to achieve in the NAFTA negotiations.
5. NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 19.
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DISCUSSION OF NAFTA AND UNFAIR TRADE
PRACTICE LAWS
QUESTION: NAFTA requires Mexico to make substantial changes in its
trade laws, especially in the area of antidumping and countervailing duties.
Yet there are no time limits by which Mexico is required to make the
changes. How soon do you anticipate that the changes will take place?
ANSWER, Lic. Von Wobeser: There is no time limit in the Agreement.
I think it was purposely done this way. Nevertheless, I believe that there
will be substantial changes in the Mexican laws and I expect them to
be adopted before the treaty comes into force, probably in 1993. 1 think
we can see in which areas the changes will be made because there is a
requirement for consultation on different issues, and we have the issues
well defined. I think principal issues concern the transparency of the
process and limitation of the discretion of regulatory authorities. I think
the laws were not changed earlier because it was a negotiating tool of
the Mexican government. I think the Mexican government is now prepared
to change them and, although there is no time limit for the change,
there is a commitment to get together on a yearly basis. The guidelines
on what the changes should be are in the Agreement. It does not
specifically state that those guidelines are for changes in laws of all three
countries, but I think some will be made in the American system. I
mentioned in my presentation that the six-month time period for rendering
a final determination has never been respected. Procedures usually take
on average nineteen months. I expect that we will have more clear rules
on that in 1993.
QUESTION: Should we conclude from the presentation of Mr. Glick
that the disparity of economic conditions between Mexico and the other
parties provides a viable argument for differences in treatment of Mexican
imports under American antidumping law?
ANSWER, Mr. Glick: Throughout the entire NAFTA negotiations, there
was debate as to whether or not the differences in the economic level
of development of Mexico should be taken into consideration. In general,
however, the same standards have been applied to Mexican goods as to
goods of the other parties. My personal view is that there should have
been a little more consideration given to these factors. I think there could
have been at least more transparency, more harmonization, and more
clarity in the American domestic procedures in antidumping and coun-
tervailing duties cases that would have made it more fair and more open,
without necessarily having a special set of rules for Mexico.
QUESTION: Is a foreign company permitted to contest the imposition
of a provisional duty by Mexico in an antidumping action?
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ANSWER, Lic. Von Wobeser: Yes. It is really the Mexican company,
the one that is importing, that may file the action protesting the imposition
of the duty. The provisional duty may be paid, and if it is cancelled or
revoked a request for reimbursement may be made. Alternatively, a bond
may be posted if SECOFI authorizes the company to do so in lieu of
payment of the duty. The bond secures the eventual payment of the
duty, but it is always the importer who contests and pays the duty.
QUESTION: Do Mexican duties always have to be paid prior to a final
determination of the propriety of their imposition?
ANSWER, Lic. Von Wobeser: The duties have to be paid, or a bond
posted, in advance. There is an option, but in case a bond is posted,
there is a requirement of prior approval by SECOFI. I think that this
is very likely to change, and I think we will see the Mexican law authorizing
the posting of a bond become automatic so that prior approval will no
longer be required as a condition for posting bond.
